Strike outcomes and wage settlements in Spain

This paper analyzes collective bargaining using Spanish firm level data. Central to the analysis are the joint determination of wage and strike outcomes in a dynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike and non-strike outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place, we confirm a negative relationship between strike duration and wage changes in a dynamic context. Furthermore, we find selection in wage equations induced by the strike outcome. In this sense, the possibility of wage determination processes being different in strike and non-strike samples is not rejected by the data. In particular, wage dynamics are of opposite sing in both strike and non-strike equations. Finally, we find evidence of a 0.33 percentage points wage change strike premium.Wage setting, strike, collective bargaining, panel data, selection

The determinants of pricing in pharmaceuticals : are U.S. prices really higher than those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursue “free-riding" regulation

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system

Claim, offer and information in wage bargaining

A stylized private-information model on the determination of the initial works council claim and the initial firm (counter) offer is analyzed in the context of the Spanish Collective Bargaining system. The Spanish system forces agents to make initial offers at the beginning ot the negotiation process. Thus initial firm offers are expected to reveal very little information. Our findings confirm such a guess. Morever, we found that initial offers crucially depend on aggregate bargaining conditions, price expectations and those variables that reflect the characteristics of the negotiation unit. However, the latter set of variables enters differently in both offer equations

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the «average» individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, as a result of the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimum pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) do not retire early despite having strong incentives to do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.retirement, Social Security, Monetary incentives, Pension Reform, Spain

Evaluating Spanish pension expenditure under alternativa reform scenario

In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number of alternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for public pensions in Spain. Our quantitative findings can be summarized in two sentences. For all the reforms considered, the financial impact of the mechanical effect (change in benefits) is order of magnitudes larger than the behavioral impact or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms, we find once again that their effect on the outstanding liability of the Spanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither the mechanical nor the behavioral effects amount to much for the 1997 reform, and amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.Social security, reform, Spain, option value

The determinants of pricing in pharmaceuticals: Are U.S. prices really higher than those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursue "free-riding" regulation.Pharmaceutical prices

Claim, offer and information in wage bargaining.

A stylized private-information model on the determination of the initial works council claim and the initial firm (counter) offer is analyzed in the context of the Spanish Collective Bargaining system. The Spanish system forces agents to make initial offers at the beginning ot the negotiation process. Thus initial firm offers are expected to reveal very little information. Our findings confirm such a guess. Morever, we found that initial offers crucially depend on aggregate bargaining conditions, price expectations and those variables that reflect the characteristics of the negotiation unit. However, the latter set of variables enters differently in both offer equations.Claim; Offer; Collective bargaining; Wage; Panel data;

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain.

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.

The Determinants of Pricing in Pharmaceuticals: Are U.S. Prices Really Higher than Those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursPharmaceutical prices